feat(new-repo): ship a self-testing privacy-guard pre-commit hook - #38
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#34) Hand-rolled name guards fail silently - the motivating field case passed everything, including a staged test leak, because of a GNU BRE quoting subtlety. Core now ships scripts/install-privacy-guard.ps1: patterns are case-insensitive literals (not regexes) entered locally and written only into .git/hooks/ (sh shim + generated pwsh guard), never the tree; a configured core.hooksPath refuses the install since it could be tracked; block messages name patterns by index so transcripts never spell the secret. Every install ends with a mandatory negative test in a throwaway fixture - clean stage passes, content leak, filename leak, and real-name identity each blocked - and removes the hook on any failure: a guard that has never failed a negative test is not yet a guard. Documented in the standard's Author identity and the pre-commit checklist; decided in ADR-0012; smoke-tested end-to-end through real git commits in CI. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_013g4xpqBjwwzfqtKyEHuWUr
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Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_013g4xpqBjwwzfqtKyEHuWUr
…en PRs Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_013g4xpqBjwwzfqtKyEHuWUr
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What & why
Hand-rolled name guards fail silently — the motivating field case passed everything, including a staged test leak, because of a GNU BRE quoting subtlety. Core now ships
scripts/install-privacy-guard.ps1: patterns are case-insensitive literals (not regexes) entered locally and written only into.git/hooks/(sh shim + generated pwsh guard), never the tree; a configuredcore.hooksPathrefuses the install since it could be tracked; block messages name patterns by index so transcripts never spell the secret. Every install ends with a mandatory negative test in a throwaway fixture — clean stage passes; content leak, filename leak, and real-name identity each blocked — and removes the hook on any failure: a guard that has never failed a negative test is not yet a guard. Documented in the standard's Author identity and the pre-commit checklist; decided in ADR-0012; smoke-tested end-to-end through realgit commitruns in CI (newsmoke-privacy-guardjob).Refs #34
Checklist
Refs #NN(no auto-close keywords), if the repo tracks issues.feat: …,fix: …,docs: …).CHANGELOG.mdupdated under## [Unreleased]if user-visible.python scripts/*.py; see.github/workflows/validate.yml).docs/adr/for any notable decision.🤖 Generated with Claude Code
https://claude.ai/code/session_013g4xpqBjwwzfqtKyEHuWUr